The end of the Doklam expansion is one of India’s most spectacular diplomatic victories for decades and, like any real victory, does not need to shout rooftops. From start to finish, the execution of India’s strategy here has been flawless and has achieved what India has always wanted – Status Quo Ante – and a much needed counter of the salami tactics in China.
The scope of victory is understood only when we realize how much a personal defeat for Xi Jinping is actually. Xi, clearly identified as the brain of this Gambit of Bhutan, had made a series of assumptions, which turned out to be erroneous. The first was the belief that India could be punished for its MIND-LIE OBJECTIVE by hiding Bhutan away from India.
The logic was that if Bhutan was hurried enough, it had to open direct talks with China through the embassy and thus open to OBOR. Opinion in Beijing seems uniform with respect to the genesis of this particular confrontation: in fact, Xi put personal immersion into the national interest. The net result of the personalization policy was one of the biggest setbacks China has found in recent memory.
Unambiguously, Chinese actions have simply added to the stature of India as a mature and responsible power of the status quo. What had become clear from day one was that China’s options were limited. On the one hand, if China used force, it would set a precedent by which other countries could also respond to the occupation of Chinese lands, not forgetting to destroy several fundamental principles of nuclear deterrence.
On the other hand, if China did not use force, it would be seen as weak – encouraging other neighbors to land on land and sea. Inadvertently, China has imposed itself on a dilemma “Doing and being doomed, not-do-and-be-doomed.” Knowing this well, India has chosen to give China a way out, even if it could have confused the land in dispute in perpetuity – just like China did. It is not a sign of weakness, it is a sign of confidence.
What exactly happened here is that India has not only found the best way to deal with China, but has also created a model for other countries to follow. China, on land, expects other countries to feel passive and not shoot. What India’s actions have shown is that China has very few options, if other countries choose to crouch on Chinese (or disputed) lands. This is now at the heart of Xi Jinping’s troubles in Beijing.
As his purge of opponents intensifies, to counter his visible mismanagement of the economy, opposition to him within the party also intensifies. Beijing was full of rumors of severe criticism that faced within the party accordingly. In addition, Global Times, with its raucous rhetoric, instead of serving as a force multiplier, worsened its situation in the politburo, preventing it from covering its error.
Normally, all Xi Jinping would have to do was tell GT to reduce it. In this situation, he could not, since such a directive would be chosen by his opponents as a sign of weakness. For Xi, even the stars conspired against him. It was particularly painful for him to welcome the BRICS summit Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Sunday with Indian troops allegedly squatting on Chinese soil – an ironic repetition when his troops squatted on our floor while Xi was held in Ahmedabad.
There was also no possibility of reprogramming the XIX Congress of the Communist Party of China, where it should be criticized harshly, albeit privately. This not only about Doklam, where his personal bump led trigger a Chinese blaze to the earth decade, but also of what is considered his poor personal management of the nuclear issue and missile And the deployment of a preventable missile shield that directly threatens Chinese security.